National Misfortunes (Part-1)

For most part of its 79 years history, Pakistan has survived in a state of ‘no war, no peace’; barring a few real war episodes mostly under a hybrid system of governance, which continues till to date. The scar of 1971 has remained a bleeding wound in our national psyche, without much desired honest retrospection at the national level. One still wonders why such a great disaster could not be avoided, which became a “National Misfortune” rather than a mere ‘military failure’. Recently I revisited a book after 30 years, which I had read in 1996, titled “Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War”, co-authored by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch. Taking some pearls of wisdom from this book, this piece is intended to highlight the imperative of re-examining our Perpetual Security Challenges with a view to offer some ‘food for thought’ to the incumbent and future national decision-makers. However, it must be underscored here that "It is difference of opinion that makes horse races”; a difference of opinion highlights how diverse thoughts drive wisdom, spark debate, or test our patience. Different cultures and classic texts view clashing viewpoints as paths to growth or traps for fools. 

Explaining why such big mishaps occur, the subject book suggests that the size of the setback is a function of the aggregation of adverse factors: The more that goes wrong , the greater the degree of failure. The bigger the stumble, the harder the fall. Rough and ready categorizing of this sort, which differentiates defeats according to their magnitude, reflects their consequences but does nothing to explain their causes. The very notion  of defeat–ostensibly the touchstone of failure–can be just as big an obstacle to understanding as disaster. Also, defeat is not the only alternative to victory. By making the concept of failure our central concern, we can incorporate into our analysis not merely battles lost, but also battles that were not won. Understanding these is every bit as important to any national and military organisation as understanding its failure. The historian Guy Chapman found plenty of that in his inquiry into the causes of ‘Fall of France in 1940’: “There was gestation, there was indecision, there was sheer bloody funk at the highest level, among ministers, politicians, generals, civil services chiefs.”

Despite a number of exemplary, brave and heroic individual and collectives acts of valour, and supreme sacrifices rendered by our Armed Forces, Pakistan’s National/military history also contains a few critical turning points where operational hesitation, strategic miscalculation, or political disconnect turned potential gains into profound setbacks, specifically the ‘Fall of Dhaka-1971’, situation in Balochistan since early 70s, mega decisions to support and fight American envisioned Wars in Afghanistan without public consent; and the missed opportunities at ‘Chhamb-Jaurian-1965 War’ and ‘Kargil War-1998/99” may be re-evaluated from this perspective for learning the right lessons for the present and future military conflicts as well as for finding better solutions for the complex domestic politico-military tangle.

During 1965 War: Chhamb-Jaurian (Operation Grand Slam), the Goal was to capture the vital Akhnoor bridge to sever Indian communication and supply lines into Kashmir. The opportunity arose as the rapid initial Armour breakthroughs by Pakistani forces in the Chhamb sector caught Indian defenses off guard, pushing them back toward the Chenab River. However, the great chance was missed as Command was abruptly transferred mid-operation from Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik to General Agha Yahya Khan. The subsequent operational pause and failure to swiftly cross and secure the Akhnoor/Chenab crossing allowed India to open a new conventional front in Punjab, forcing a redirection of forces and converting a prospective tactical success into a strategic stalemate. The 1965 failure to secure Akhnoor—and the broader strategic miscalculation of starting a conventional escalation without securing depth or international border contingencies—highlighted the danger of disjointed operational phases. Pakistan military planning later emphasized command stability and avoiding mid-stream leadership changes during high-tempo offensives. 

During 1971 War: Dhaka and former Pakistan, a refusal to honour the 1970 democratic election results and a reliance on military force through ‘Operation Searchlight’ permanently alienated the population of East Pakistan, creating an impossible environment for the military command, as a result of what could be described as the political failure. The Eastern Command was left isolated, vastly outnumbered by Indian forces and the Mukti Bahini, with zero possibility of external reinforcement or Naval/Air relief from West Pakistan, which made it a ‘Strategic Trap’ for the military and stranded West Pakistanis. Nevertheless, for the similar reasons as for the ‘Fall of France’ described above, the available (honourable) opportunity was missed i.e. instead of seeking an early political compromise or managing an orderly withdrawal/defence to preserve institutional integrity, leadership held out on flawed assumptions of international intervention, culminating in the unconditional surrender in Dhaka on December 16, 1971.

The primary political takeaway from 1971 was that state integrity cannot rely on military force alone while ignoring the political and economic rights of majority populations. The debacle underscored that domestic political alienation, ethnic marginalization, and delayed democratic transitions are far more lethal national security threats than external adversaries.

To continue…