National Misfortunes (Part-2)

On the heels of greatest ‘National Misfortune’ that converted ‘East Pakistan’ into ‘Bangladesh’, and without learning the appropriate lessons, another similar major conflict was initiated in 1973 in Balochistan, shortly after (then) Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto repeated similar mistake as in former East Pakistan and dismissed the elected provincial government of Balochistan on the pretext that arms had been discovered in a foreign Embassy, ostensibly for Baloch rebels. The ensuing protest against the dismissal of the duly elected government also led to calls for Balochistan's secession, met by Bhutto's ordering the Pakistan Army into the province.

Akbar Khan Bugti served as provincial governor during the early stages of the conflict. Fighting was intermittent throughout the conflict, climaxing in 1974 with drawn-out battles. The Bhutto regime was overthrown on 5 July 1977, and martial law was imposed. A general amnesty was declared by the military governor. Military action ended by November 1977, replaced by development and educational policies to conciliate the province; which in fact should have preceded the ultimate choice of military option. Since then, instead of giving primacy to an amicable political solution through true  political representation, the bull-headed approach has kept the security situation simmering in Balochistan till date with Pakistan’s foes adding fuel to the fire. Can we apply the relevant lessons from these debacles on the current political fragmentation in Pakistan?

From the 1970s military action under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to the ongoing acts of terrorism/insurgencies linked to infrastructure projects like CPEC, Pakistan has faced recurring conflict in Balochistan, with ever multiplying proxies getting more and more complex and better equipped by their sponsors. Over decades of kinetic operations, the State has absorbed several difficult structural and strategic lessons: Operations can temporarily clear terrain or suppress immediate revolts, but they cannot erase the underlying political discontent that feeds new cycles of rebellion. The local grievances need to be addressed so that the population does not feel excluded from the economic benefits. Arbitrary dismissal of elected provincial governments—a core trigger in the 1973 crisis—continues to destabilize local governance and drives moderate nationalists toward radical resistance. Modern counter-terrorism requires balancing operational precision with adherence to constitutional norms to isolate militant networks from the broader populace. 

Again, during 1998/1999 Kargil Operation, The Concept was ‘Secret high-altitude occupation of vacant winter ridge-lines across the Line of Control to choke Ladakh logistics and force India to negotiate Kashmir. Nevertheless, conceived by a small military coterie assuming that mutual nuclear capability (tested in 1998) would paralyze India into inaction and prevent a major conventional or air response and ignoring domestic political and economic fragility, logistic nightmare, extremely difficult terrain and weather, lack of Inter-services coordination in the name of secrecy and above all international pressure emerged as the major miscalculations for otherwise a brilliant tactical/ operational plan with possible strategic dividends. Critics opine that the operation lacked synchronized political, diplomatic, and military backing. Failing to anticipate fierce Indian military retaliation, domestic political and economic frailty and absolute diplomatic isolation by major global powers like the United States, Pakistan was forced into an unceremonious, unilateral withdrawal.

The roots of most of the internal and external challenges confronted by Pakistan in the current environments, can be traced back to Pakistan’s decisions to support American for fighting her war in Afghanistan in 1979 against former USSR. However, as the war ended in 1989 and USSR withered away giving birth to a number of Independent States, Pakistan and the Taliban/ multi-national Fighting Forces in Afghanistan were left in the lurch with abundant weapons and ammunition left behind by the USSR & proxies users. That gave birth to civil war in Afghanistan and rise of Taliban Government in Afghanistan by 1994, migration of millions of Afghans into Pakistan along with weapons and drugs proliferation, extremism and terrorism in addition to unbearable socioeconomic burden.

To add salt to the wound, Pakistan was coerced into yet another war in Afghanistan in 2001, this time against the same Taliban tagged Terrorists allegedly for harbouring Al-Qaeda/ Osama Bin Laden who were blamed for Twin Towers destruction in New York, USA. After complete destruction of Afghanistan in 20 years, and simultaneous annihilation of governments, leaders and infrastructure in a number of countries in the Middle East like Iraq, Libya, and Syria, the USA/ Allies moved away in 2021 leaving Pakistan again in an intractable state of war on a multiple fronts & from all directions less China. Yet again, allegedly the USA managed to topple another popular elected government in Pakistan in 2022 and by 2025 invaded Iran along with Israel that continues till to date, which has jeopardised the regional peace and economy.

Ironically, Pakistan again finds herself in the eye of the storm, sometimes undertaking nudged diplomatic role as a facilitator/ mediator and then fast forward to signing of Macca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA-2026)__celebrated in an overjoyed manner.  Nevertheless, it raises more questions than answers, none without strategic ramifications; despite projection of only the brighter side of the coin by the incumbent movers and shakers in Pakistan. The acquired inability to learn, remember and apply the lessons learned from our past continues to push the country towards a fall from a cliff, erroneously depicted as climbing a summit.

To continue…